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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FRED WALKER,
Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8224

C. C. BINTZ, and SHAW, INC., a
corporation of the State of Utah,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the statement, the appellant, C. C. Bintz will be
designated as "Bintz," the appellant Shaw, Inc. as "Shaw"
and the respondent, Fred Walker, as "Walker." Emphasis
has been supplied.
This case involves the construction of the instrument
commonly used in the State of Utah in connection with real
estate transactions, designated as an "Earnest Money Re-
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ceipt and Offer to Purchase" and herein referred to as
"Earnest Money Receipt."
In 1951 Bintz contemplated the purchase of a parcel
of land in Salt Lake County, Utah. He engaged his counsel, a capable lawyer of wide experience, to examine the
abstract. Counsel as a result of such examination and the
examination of certain probate records and a survey which
showed the exterior boundaries of the premises, approved
the title for purchase (R. 84-94).
Bintz bought the property and took title thereto. In
1953 he decided to sell. He listed the property with Shaw
who is a real estate broker. Shaw found Walker as a purchaser who on May 11, 1953, signed the Earnest Money
Receipt (R. 86). Bintz on the next day accepted the terms
thereof. The sale price was $30,250.00, payable $1,000.00
down, $4,000.00 on delivery of final contract of sale which
was to be on July 11, 1953, and $500.00 or more each
month commencing August 11, 1953, balance to be paid in
full on or before July 11, 1956, with interest on deferred
principal at the rate of 5% per annum. The Earnest Money
Receipt (Exhibit 1) contains the following further provisions:
"We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill
the terms and conditions specified above, and the
Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title
with abstract to date or at Seller's option a policy
of title insurance in the name of the purchaser and
to make final conveyance by warranty deed."
Walker paid Shaw the down payment of $1,000.00.
Bintz submitted his abstract of title. Walker's counsel ex·
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3
amined the same and noted certain title exceptions. Bintz
having purchased the property as a result of the examination of his counsel regarded his title as good. However, he
did not stand on the opinion of his counsel, but authorized
Shaw to take any steps within reason to satisfy Walker.
Shaw accordingly consulted Utah Savings & Trust Abstract
Company with respect to procuring a policy of title insurance. Bintz consented to the payment of the necessary
costs and fees for the issuance of such title insurance including the costs of quieting the title if necessary. Arrangements were going forward on July 11, 1953, with Utah
Savings & Trust Abstract Company to perfect the title and
for the issuance of the title insurance policy but title had
not been perfected or a policy of title insurance issued on
that day. On or prior to July 11, 1953, Bintz prepared and
signed a uniform real estate contract, dated July 11, 1953,
for the sale and purchase of the premises embodying the
terms of the Earnest Money Receipt. This form of contract
was tendered to Walker for signature. Walker made no
objection to the form of such proposed contract, but refused to sign the same. On July 11, 1953, Walker repudiated
the contract as embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt on
the alleged ground that Bintz had not furnished good and
marketable title as required by the instrument and demanded a return of his down payment (R. 103-109, Exhibits 1,
3,7,8and9).
The Earnest Money Receipt contains no provision that
time is of the essence in the contract.
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Bintz refused to return the down payment. The Earnest Money Receipt contains the following further provision:
"In the event the purchaser fails to pay the
balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon
shall at the option of the Seller be retained as liquidated and agreed damages."
Walker brought suit against Bintz and Shaw for the
recovery of the down payment and attorney's fees. Suit
was brought in two counts. One for money had and received, and the other for breach of contract in failing to
furnish marketable title on July 11, 1953 (R. 1-4).
Bintz counterclaimed alleging the making of the contract as embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt and that
while the same was in force and effect and he was ready,
able and willing to perform thereunder, Walker repudiated.
Bintz alleged the provisions for retention of the down payment as liquidated damages and alleged in addition his
actual damages for loss of his bargain and for injury to
his property (R. 9-12).
The trial court denied recovery on Walker's first count,
held Walker entitled to recover against both Bintz and
Shaw with interest from May 11, 1953, on the second count
and denied recovery on the Bintz counterclaim (R. 147-153).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS A
COMPLETE CONTRACT AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT SO HOLDING.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARKETABLE TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953.
(a) The Earnest Money Receipt does not Require
that Marketable Title be Furnished on July
11, 1953.
(b) If the Earnest Money Receipt Actually Required the Furnishing of Marketable Title on
July 11, 1953, the Seller was Entitled to a
Reasonable Time Thereafter to Perfect his
Title.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
RECOVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTERCLAIM.
(a) The Contract was in Force and Effect When
the Purchaser Repudiated.
(b) Bintz was Entitled to Enforce the Contractual
Provisions for Liquidated Damages.
(c) The A(!tual Damages of Bintz Exceed $1,000.00.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT
SHAW.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
RECOVERY OF INTEREST FROM MAY 11,
1953.
ARGUMENT
Much of the evidence in this case goes to the question
of whether the abstract submitted by Bintz showed marketable title in him. Counsel for Bintz passed the title. Counsel for Walker opined that it was defective. Reasonable men
might differ on the question. If the title were unmarketable
the defects arose because of uncertain descriptions early
in the chain of title. No one asserted any adverse claim to
the premises and no one expressed any doubt that the title
could be cured by an action to quiet title.
We believe it unnecessary for the court on this appeal
to determine whether the title as disclosed by the abstract
was marketable. It may be assumed here that it was not.
This case, it seems to us, is controlled by a determination of the question as to when Bintz was obligated to
furnish marketable title. The question has two aspects.
Was Bintz obligated to furnish marketable title prior to
full performance by the purchaser? If Bintz was obligated
to furnish marketable title on part performance by the
purchaser on July 11, 1953, did Bintz have a reasonable
time thereafter in which to cure title defects?
Under the points relied on appellants will present their
views on this problem. Points IV and V seem clearly to
require a reversal of the judgment of the trial court, hoW·
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ever, they do not bear directly upon the issue which we
regard as of importance in this case.
POINT I.
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS A
COMPLETE CONTRACT AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT SO HOLDING.
In the view of appellants, a proper disposition of this
case requires at the outset a recognition of the nature of
Earnest Money Receipts. These instruments in substantially the same form as the Earnest Money Receipt here involved have been before this court for construction in
several cases.
In Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P. 2d 893, this
court considered such an Earnest Money Receipt in an
action for specific performance. There the appellant seeking to avoid the instrument contended (1) that the parties
did not intend the so called "preliminary agreement" to be
a binding contract and (2) that such instrument was incomplete and uncertain in various particulars so that
specific performance could not be decreed without imposing terms to which the parties had not agreed.
The court fully considered the nature of the instrument and held it to be a binding and enforceable contract
complete in itself.
In Olsen v. Tholen, 111 Utah 241, 177 P. 2d 75, this
court
again had before it an Earnest Money Receipt and
1
j sustained a decree of specific performance based thereon.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

In Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, Inc., __ Utah
_ _, 234 P. 2d 842, this court considered an Earnest Money
Receipt in connection with an action by a broker for the
recovery of a commission and held the instrument sufficiently complete to sustain such an action. See also, Reich v.
Christopulos, - - Utah ~-, 256 P. 2d 238.
So in the case at bar, the instrument embodies a complete contract for the sale and purchase of the premises
involved because it sets forth all the essential terms of sale
and purchase; namely, sale price, down payment, monthly
installments, date of final payment, rate of interest on deferred principal, character of title to be furnished, abstract
or title insurance to be delivered, and the form of conveyance. What more is necessary to make out an enforceable contract, complete in itself?
The fact that upon the payment of the $4,000.00 on
July 11, 1953, the parties contemplated the making of a
further contract is immaterial. This same problem was involved in Johnson v. Jones, supra. The court in meeting
this contention, at page 97 of the Utah Report, makes the
following statement :
"As to the claim that the instrument sued on
refers to another contract to be executed, the form
of which is indefinite, we need only mention that
the terms and conditions specified in the prelimin·
ary agreement are also specified in the uniform
real estate contract form of which the buyers signed
and which was submitted to the seller for his signature. He made no objection at the time of presenta·
tion that it attempted to impose on him any conditions to which he had not already assented. In fact
he paid no attention to it. It might have been better
if the preliminary agreement had specifically men-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

tioned the 'uniform real estate contract' so that the
printed form would have been incorporated by
reference, but in view of what we have said relative
to the claimed uncertainty just dealt with, further
discussion of this contention is unnecessary."
No contention was made here that the proposed uniform real estate 'Contract did not embody the terms already agreed upon. Walker in the case at bar, like the seller
in the Johnson case, simply paid no attention to the proposed contract. The contention of Walker was that he was
relieved of obligations under the Earnest Money Receipt and
was entitled to repudiate it because, as he asserted, the
seller had not delivered to him a marketable title on the
11th day of July, 1953.
Appellant will hereafter consider the question as to
whether the seller was bound to deliver marketable title
on July 11, 1953, and the rights and duties of the parties
in connection with the furnishing of title, but it seems
fundamental to us that the trial court could not properly
determine the issues involved in this case without recognizing the outset that the Earnest Money Receipt embodied a
complete enforceable contract.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARKETABLE TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953.
(a) The Earnest Money Receipt does not Require
that Marketable Title be Furnished on July
11, 1953.
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The trial court appears to have concluded that the
seller was obligated to furnish marketable title on July
11, 1953. In this there was error.
The contract does not impose such a duty on the seller.
The contract provisions bearing upon this obligation are as
follows:
"The seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title with abstract to date or at seller's option
a policy of title insurance in the name of the purchaser and to make final conveyance by warranty
deed."
What is meant by the phrase "to date?" The trial
court apparently concluded that the phrase meant the date
of July 11, 1953. Such a conclusion, however, does not find
support in the contract itself. Several dates appear upon
the face of the instrument. The instrument is dated May
11, 1953; Bintz accepted the proposal on May 12, 1953; on
July 11, 1953 the additional $4,000.00 was to be paid; on
August 11, 1953, the monthly payments were to commence;
while on or before July 11, 1956, the purchase price was
to be paid in full. Which of these dates if any, is identified
in the phrase "to date?" By testing the question on the basis
of reason and logic, it can readily be demonstrated that the
date of July 11, 1953, is not the date referred to in the
phrase. Assume that the title of the seller were marketable
on the 11th day of July, 1953, but at the time of conveyance
the title had for any reason become wholly unmarketable.
Would the purchaser seriously contend that Bintz had
performed his contract by furnishing a title, marketable
some three years prior to date of conveyance, but worthless
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upon delivery of deed? The merchantability of a seller's
title is determined as of the time when the buyer is entitled to receive that title. This is not an arbitrary rule of
property law, but is a rule based upon reason and the practical necessities of real estate transactions; its application
enables a purchaser to protect himself by procuring the
title bargained for at the time that title becomes vested
in him by conveyance.
In the recent case before this court of Woodard v.
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 221, 265 P. 2d 398, the defendant in the
purchase of land agreed to pay $500.00 down, $27,000.00
in one month, and $4,000.00 or more each year for five
years thereafter, and plaintiffs agreed to convey by warranty deed upon payment being made. Defendant paid the
down payment by a check which was later stopped, and
plaintiff brought suit to enforce the contract and for recovery of the money then due under the same. Defendant
attacked the marketability of the plaintiff's title. In holding that the time to test the marketability of the plaintiff's
title was at the time of conveyance this court said:
"Defendants attack on the marketability of
plaintiff's title was premature, since, under the
authorities, that fact is determinable, not as of the
date of execution of the contract, but as of the time
a vendee tenders that which, under the contract,
would require the vendor to transfer not only
marketable title, but the title which the latter agreed
to convey."
,~

The rule announced in Woodard v. Allen supra is in
~ accordance with the general rule prevailing in this country.
~
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See 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 153 and
277.
The case at bar seems clearly to fall within the general
rule announced by this court in Woodard v. Allen supra.
The phrase "to date" must mean the date of performance
by seller. Accordingly, the attack by 'Valker upon the Bintz
title in July, 1953, was premature and the repudiation by
Walker was therefore unlawful.
Nor is the situation altered by the fact that Bintz
having a difficult and reluctant buyer on the contract,
voluntarily undertook to do anything within reason in
an effort to satisfy the demands of the purchaser.
(b) If the Earnest Money Receipt Actually Required the Furnishing of Marketable Title on
July 11, 1953, the Seller was Entitled to a
Reasonable Time Thereafter to Perfect his
Title.
We earnestly believe that the contractual duty of the
seller was to furnish marketable title upon conveyance of
the property. Assuming, however, for the purpose of this
presentation that the contract required the seller to exhibit
good title on July 11, 1953, the seller would nevertheless
be entitled to a reasonable time thereafter in which to per·
fect his title.
As we pointed out in the Statement of Facts, there is
no provision in the Earnest Money Receipt that time was
of the essence of the contract. The general rule of law in
the United States is to the effect that in contracts for the
sale of real estate, unless time is expressly made the essence
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of the contract, the seller has a reasonable time after the
purchase price is due in which to perfect his title.
This rule is stated in 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, Section 273, as follows:
"Where time is not of the essence of the contract, and is not made essential by an offer to fulfill
by the purchaser, and a request for a conveyance,
the vendor is entitled to a reasonable time and opportunity to secure or perfect his title. In these
circumstances an arbitrary and sudden determination of the transaction cannot be permitted immediately to end pending disputes and negotiations as to
title. The vendor must be allowed a reasonable
length of time in which to perform. An arbitrary
notice of termination may be entirely disregarded.
What is a reasonable time in which to perfect defects in the title depends upon the circumstances."
The facts in Larkin v. Koether, 137 A. 849 (New
Jersey) are particularly analagous to the case at bar.
There suit was brought for specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands. The contract contained a covenant that the buildings upon the premises were all within
the boundary lines of the property and that there were no
encroachments. The fact was that a building on the land
encroached upon a street at the time the contract was
made. The defendant sought to avoid the effect of the
contract by attempted recision at the time set for performance. The court in denying this contention said in
part:
"It should be noted that immediately upon discovery of the alleged encroachment and one day

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
before the date fixed for settlement, the defendant
advised complainant that he would not accept title,
demanding the return of his down money, and attempting to rescind the contract of sale. No opportunity was given to complainant for the removal
of the title objection, and the possibility of its removal is indicated by the adoption of the ordinance
above referred to. Obviously, this arbitrary action
cannot be justified because time was not the essence
of the contract and no definite date was thereafter
fixed by either of the parties for closing." (Citing
Pomeroy's Specific Performance, Section 396.)
For a further discussion of this question and a collection of cases on the subject, see 57 A. L. R. Page 1519.
The rule announced above is particularly applicable
here. Even if we assume that Bintz was obligated to exhibit marketable title on July 11, 1953, Walker was not
then entitled to conveyance. In fact, three more years were
allowed under the contract before the full purchase price
was due. Bintz was ready and willing to take all steps
necessary to perfect his title. He had ample time in which
to do so, and there was no intimation in this case that the
Bintz title could not be perfected by the action to quiet
title. A clearer case could hardly be found for invoking
the rule which prevents a purchaser from seizing upon an
asserted unmarketability of title as a ground for charging
a seller with breach of contract.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
RECOVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTERCLAIM.
(a) The Contract was in Force and Effect When
the Purchaser Repudiated.
On July 11, 1953, the contract of sale and purchase,
as embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt, was in force
and effect. This is true whether or not the contract required the furnishing of marketable title on that day, for
as hereinabove shown, even though Bintz were required
to furnish marketable title, on July 11, 1953, time not being
of the essence, he had a reasonable time thereafter to do so.
This being so, Walker had no right on that day to
repudiate. He, however, did so and Bintz upon such repudiation by Walker had the right either to disregard the repudiation and proceed to compel performance or he could
treat the contract as totally breached and at an end. The
rule on this subject is stated in the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, 1948 Supplement, Section 318 as follows:
"In the case (1) of a bilateral contract that has
not become unilateral by full performance on one
side, and (2) of a unilateral contract where the
agreed exchange for the promise or for its performance has not .been given, any of the following
acts, done without justification by a promisor in a
contract before he has committed a breach under
the rules stated in sections 314-315, constitutes an
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anticipatory repudiation which is a total breach of
contract:
"(a) a positive statement to the promisee
or other person having a right under the contract, indicating that the promisor will not or
cannot substantially perform his contractual
duties."
The conduct of Walker on July 11, 1953, falls precisely
within the rule of this restatement. For Walker through
the letter and oral representations of his counsel on that
date, stated positively that he would not perform the contract, repudiated the same, and demanded the return of his
down payment.
It is elementary of course that a total breach of a contract brings the contract to an end and gives the aggrieved
party a right to the recovery of damages arising from the
breach. This being the case, it is inescapable that Bintz
had a cause of action against Walker for his total breach of
the contract. The only remaining question is the extent of
the damage that Bintz was entitled to recover.

(b) Bintz was Entitled to Enforce the Contractual
Provisions for Liquidated Damages.
The contract as herein. shown provides among other
things that in the event the purchaser fails to pay the
balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase as
herein provided, the amounts paid hereon shall at the option of the seller be retained as liquidated and agreed
damages.
Walker is a building contractor, ~ngaged in real estate
operations, and familiar with real estate transactions and
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dealings. The total purchase price was $30,250.00; the down
payment of $1,000.00 was therefore less than 4% of this
purchase price. No fraud, concealment or misrepresentation
is alleged or suggested. There are no facts here upon which
a court might properly find that the retention by Bintz
of the down payment of $1,000.00 would be oppressive, unconscionable or exorbitant. This case does not fall within
the rule announced by this court in Perkins v. Spencer,_
Utah_, 243 P. 2d 446. On the contrary, this case quite
clearly involves a situation where the amount retained is
proportionate to the damages actually sustained and comes
within the rule of Bramwell v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P. 2d
913; Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98; Cooley v.
Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 977; Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah
313, 121 P. 2d 401, and other cases which have sustained
provisions for liquidated damages.
(c) The Actual Damages of Bintz Exceed $1,000.00.
Manford Shaw of the appellant Shaw, Inc. testified
with respect to the damages sustained by Bintz for the
loss of bargain. His testimony shows that after Walker
repudiated efforts were made to sell the property. It was
offered at $27,500.00, but no buyer was secured. A conditional offer of $25,000.00 was obtained. ·The condition
was that a water main extension from Salt Lake City could
be secured. Bintz accepted the conditional offer. Through
1 no fault of his the water main could not be obtained, and
the transaction fell through. No other or better offer could
. be obtained (R. 109-111):
1

1
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Manford Shaw further testified, without dispute, that
because of the time element alone, wholly apart from the
physical condition of the property itself, the loss of Bintz
from the Walker repudiation was in excess of $1,000.00
(R. 113).
After the Walker repudiation and the inability of
Bintz to sell the property in its entirety, Bintz concluded to
subdivide the premises, construct the necessary improvements and dispose of the property in lots. Counsel for respondent sought to show that the realization of Bintz by
this method of disposition would be greater than under
the Walker sale. Although Bintz had not yet determined
all of his costs in connection with the subdivision, his best
judgment was that he would realize from the sale of lots
from $2,000.00 to $2,500.00 less than under the Walker
sale and in addition he would be under the necessity of
selling the property piecemeal (R. 132-133).
From this evidence it is clear that the actual damage
of Bintz was in excess of $1,000.00.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT
SHAW.
As herein shown Walker repudiated the contract at a
time when the same was in force and effect and Bintz was
entitled to recover and retain the liquidated damages of
$1,000.00. The trial court appears to have failed to perceive
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the nature of the relationship of the parties and the legal
results flowing from their conduct and the actual issues
involved in this case. The error of the court in this respect
is demonstrated by permitting recovery against the appellant Shaw.
As herein shown, Walker proceeded on two counts.
One, for money had and received, the other for damages for
breach of contract. Recovery was denied under the first
count and allowed under the second against both Bintz and
Shaw.
Shaw was not a party to the contract. It acted only as
a broker. The agency of Shaw was shown on the face of the
contract and known to the parties throughout the transaction. The actual contract of sale and purchase was between
Walker and Bintz alone. They signed the instrument as
principals.
Under these facts, it seems quite elementary that no
judgment for damages arising from breach of contract
could be had or recovered against Shaw. The rule is announced in Restatement of the Law of Agency, Section 328
as follows:
"An agent, by making a contract only on behalf
of a competent, disclosed or partially disclosed principal whom he has power so to bind, does not thereby become liable for its non-performance."
Most surely Shaw was not liable for any breach of
the contract here involved and the court erred in allowing
judgment against it.
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POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
RECOVERY OF INTEREST FROM MAY 11,
1953.
No recovery of the principal sum of $1,000.00 should
have been allowed in this case for the reasons herein shown.
The apparent inability of the trial court to perceive the
nature of the case and the issues actually involved is further
demonstrated in its treatment of interest.
Under no theory could it be contended that the retention of the $1,000.00 down payment by Bintz was wrongful
prior to the demand of July 11, 1953. Until the retention became wrongful, interest was not allowable. This rule has
received universal recognition. It is stated in 30 Am.
Jur. Interest, Section 46 as follows:
"Where a person wrongfully detains money, no
demand is necessary to charge him with interest,
but where there is no wrong in acquiring or detaining the money, a demand is necessary to charge the
party with interest, and its computation will begin
on such demand." (Citing numerous cases.)
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CONCLUSION
Bintz and Walker entered into a contract for the sale
1d purchase of real estate. This contract was in force
1d effect on July 11, 1953, regardless of whether Bintz
as obligated on that day to furnish marketable title, for
ren though he was . t so obligated he had a reasonable
me to perfect title. While the contract was thus in force
1d effect, Walker repudiated thereby committing a total
reach of the contract. This repudiation precluded Walker
~om claiming breach of contract and entitled Bintz to sue
>r damages sustained. The liquidated damages provision
f the contract is reasonable and enforceable in this case;
1 any event, the actual damages of Bintz exceed the liquidted amount provided for in the contract. While the foreoing propositions dispose of the essential issues in this
ase, the error of the trial court in failing to perceive these
1sues is further demonstrated in permitting recovery
gainst the appellant Shaw and in allowing interest from
date prior to demand for return of the $1,000.00.
The case should be reversed and remanded with direclon to enter judgment in favor of Bintz on his counterclaim
ermitting and allowing him to retain the $1,000.00 as
amages for Walker's breach of contract.
Respectfully submitted,
S. N. CORNWALL,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Appellants,
C. C. Bintz and Shaw, Inc.
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